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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROYCE BISWELL, ] 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
vs. ] 
DIANE G. DUNCAN, ] 
Defendant-Respondent. ] 
) Case N o . 20709 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
FACTS 
It is undisputed that the accident occurred at the T-
intersection of 5065 West and North Temple in Salt Lake City, 
Utah. There was, however, no evidence presented at trial or 
during discovery which would sustain any allegation that the 
defendant failed to stop at the stop sign controlling the inter-
section. Plaintiff herself states the following in her deposi-
tion: 
Q. And as far as Miss Duncan is 
concerned, you don't know whether she 
actually stopped at the stop sign or do 
you? 
A. I did not see her stopped. I 
didn't see her until she was coming into 
the street. 
Q. Is there anything that would 
obstruct your vision or her vision as 
she stopped at the stop sign? 
A. No. I don't think so. 
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Q. Do you have any idea why you 
didnft see her at the stop sign? 
A. I donft think she stopped. 
Q. But you didn't see her run 
through the stop sign? 
A, No, I actually didn't, but I 
don't — I don't think she stopped. I 
think—I can't really remember. I mean 
truthfully I don't remember. 
Q. Well, what makes you think 
she didn't stop? 
A. I think she didn't stop because 
I seen her car. There are trees beside 
the road—little trees they planted, and 
just before you get there, maybe like that, 
it's — I seen her car at this point just 
before the little trees, and I don't think 
there was enough time to stop. 
(Biswell deposition, p. 16, line 6 through p. 17, line 1.) 
Plaintiff goes on and states: 
Q. Well, you didn't see her in 
one continuous motion run through the 
stop sign, did you? 
A. I don't remember that she did--
I don't—I don't think she had time to 
stop, but I don't know. 
Q. I'm just trying to get that 
cleared up. 
We'll mark that as Exhibit 1 when we're 
through. 
Do you have any estimate as to how fast 
Miss Duncan was traveling at the time 
that you first noticed an accident was 
going to take place? 
A. No. 
(Biswell deposition, p. 19, lines 12-21.) 
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During the trial plaintiff testified: 
Q. Now, you didn't see Ms. Duncan actually 
run the stop sign, did you? 
A. No. 
Actually drive through the stop sign here 
on the side of the street. 
A. No. But I never got to the point of 
seeing her at the stop sign. 
(Partial Transcript, p. 118, lines 11-17.) 
Tessie Higgs, a witness to the accident who was 
following the plaintiff just prior to the accident, states: 
Q. When did you first see Miss Duncan? 
Where was her vehicle at the time you 
first saw her? 
A. Just pulling out of the intersection 
that she was coming through. 
Q. Was her vehicle in North Temple, 
in that street? 
A. You could say from the front of 
her car to the front tire was when I seen 
her car. 
Q. Okay. But her vehicle had passed 
the stop sign area or the place where 
you normally stop? 
A. Yes. 
Q. At the time you first saw her? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. 
A. But it was moving at that time also. 
Q. I understand. It was moving? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Okay. Did you get—when you saw the 
car, the first time you saw Miss Duncan's 
car, did you determine how fast it was 
moving? 
A. No. 
Q. Is it possible to estimate? I don't 
want you to guess. 
A. No, I'm not going to guess, but 
I couldn't tell you how fast she was going; 
but, I do know she was moving at the time 
because when the white car pulled out in 
front of Miss Biswell--first of all, I 
could think of when I seen—you glance 
opposite direction to see what else is 
going to come out in front of you. Well, 
I knew Miss Biswell was going to be hit. 
But I wouldn't guess on the speed. 
(Tessie Higgs deposition, p. 21, line 8 through p. 22, line 12.) 
In this regard, the defendant Diane Duncan states in her 
deposition: 
Q. You did see the stop sign and you stopped? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you come to a complete stop. 
A. Yes. 
(Duncan deposition, p. 22, lines 16-19.) 
Q. You mention that you stopped 
at the stop sign. Then what did you do? 
A. Proceeded to turn left onto 
North Temple. 
Q. Did you look both ways? 
A. As I recall I did. 
Q. Did you see any traffic? 
A. No. 
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Q. You didn't see any oncoming traffic? 
A. No. 
Q. So you didn't see Miss Biswell coming? 
A. No. 
(Id. at p. 24, line 3 through p. 25, line 6.) 
Thus, no one saw the defendant fail to stop at the stop 
sign and the only evidence of such was the plaintiff's mere 
speculation. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Utah law has long held that the imposition of punitive 
damages requires malice, ill will or evil motive. Although the 
court in Terry v. ZCMI, 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979); modified 617 
P.2d 700 (Utah 1980), allowed a standard of "reckless disregard" 
as a basis for punitive damages only in false imprisonment cases, 
the court later specifically overturned the Terry decision in 
McFarland v. Skaggs Companies, Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984). 
Since Terry was overturned, the court by implication overturned 
those cases relying upon Terry in applying or allowing the appli-
cation of a "reckless disregard" standard. Therefore, plaintiff 
cannot recover punitive damages without showing malice, ill will 
or evil motive. 
Even if this court determines that a "knowing and reck-
less indifference" standard as set out in Terry should be applied 
for punitive damages, such standard properly focuses upon the 
state of mind of the defendant and requires knowing indifference. 
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In this case, there was clearly no evidence whatsoever 
of any reckless conduct on the part of the defendant, or any evi-
dence of a "knowing indifference" to any specific person or 
event. Furthermore, there was no evidence that any intoxication 
contributed in any way to the accident in this case, and the 
facts in this accident could just as easily be explained through 
simple negligence. Since there was no reckless conduct, punitive 
damages are clearly inappropriate under either standard the court 
chooses to apply. 
Driving while intoxicated, in and of itself, is insuf-
ficient to justify an award of punitive damages. Clearly there 
must be some evidence that the intoxication contributed to the 
accident and that defendant's conduct was reckless. Thus if the 
court wished to allow for punitive damages in intoxication cases, 
defendant contends that there should likewise be some evidence 
beyond what can otherwise be viewed as simple negligence. To 
allow punitive damages to go to the jury in the instant case 
would allow it in every case involving intoxication, no matter 
the level of intoxication or the other factors in the case. 
Utah social policy clearly does not mandate the imposi-
tion of punitive damages in this case. The Utah Supreme Court in 
Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc., 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 
1983), clearly stated that punitive damages are not appropriate 
unless the defendant's conduct is outrageous and malicious and 
not likely to be deterred by other means. Since the Utah 
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legislature has passed one of the strongest and most severe 
impaired driving laws in the country, such conduct is likely to 
be deterred by those laws. In this regard, the legislature has 
established what it considered to be the proper punishment and 
deterrence for driving under the influence of intoxicants. The 
Utah Supreme Court has made it clear that punitive damages are 
not intended as compensation for the plaintiff but are to serve 
the interests of society. The plaintiff should not be allowed to 
penalize the defendant a second time by lining her own pockets 
with money taken in the interests of society in addition to her 
own recovery of compensatory damages. 
Since the defendant in this case has already been sub-
jected once to a criminal penalty for her conduct, she should not 
be penalized a second time for that very same conduct. To allow 
this second penalty would be a clear violation of the 
Constitution of Utah which prohibits any person from being twice 
put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Finally, the trial court properly denied plaintiff1s 
motion for new trial based upon the trial court's jury 
instruction. The trial court's instruction on aggravation was a 
correct statement of Utah law and in no way prejudicial to the 
defendant. 
If the issues listed on plaintiff's docketing statement 
but not addressed in his brief are not waived, defendant requests 
an opportunity to respond to those issues. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I, 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES MAY NOT BE AWARDED IN UTAH 
WITHOUT EVIDENCE OF MALICE, KNOWING, ILL WILL 
OR EVIL MOTIVE. 
Utah law has long held that the awarding of punitive 
damages requires malice, ill will or evil motive. "Punitive 
damages are not awarded for mere inadvertence, mistake, errors of 
judgement and the like, which constitute ordinary negligence." 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §908 comment b at 465 (1979). 
One of the early cases to address this standard was 
Murphy vs. Booth, 36 Utah 285, 103 P. 768 (1909). Plaintiff in 
that case filed a claim against defendant alleging malicious 
prosecution. Plaintiff there contended that defendant had 
instituted a criminal complaint against plaintiff alleging that 
plaintiff had obtained money under false pretenses. Plaintiff 
further alleged that defendant's action was "falsely, wickedly 
and maliciously" contrived with the intent to injure plaintiff, 
without any reasonable or probable cause. At trial, the court 
charged the jury: 
If you find from the evidence that the 
defendant caused plaintiff to be arrested 
for the purpose of assisting defendant in 
collecting a claim for monies which defendant 
thought he had against plaintiff, or to 
compel the delivery of property, or to 
satisfy some grudge or hatred, or to 
accomplish some other ulterior or wrongful 
purpose, then it was begun maliciously as 
though inspired by revenge. 
103 P. at 770. 
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The award of punitive damages, reduced by the trial court, was 
affirmed on appeal. The Utah Supreme Court, adopting the rule 
suggested by the appellant stated: 
Exemplary, punitive or vindictive damages 
are such damages as are in excess of the 
actual loss, and are allowed where a 
tort is aggravated by evil motive, actual 
malice, deliberate violence, oppression 
or fraud. 
103 P. at 768. 
In order to sustain an award for punitive damages, the Utah 
Supreme Court as early as the Murphy case required a state of 
mind which evidenced evil motive, actual malice, deliberate 
violence, oppression or fraud. 
In Evans vs. Gainsford, 122 Utah 156, 247 P.2d. 431 
(Utah 1953), plaintiff brought an action for assault and battery. 
The court awarded plaintiff $1 ,000.00 compensatory damages and 
$1,499.05 in punitive damages. In so doing, the court stated: 
Punitive or exemplary damages are awarded as 
punishment to the defendant for malicious 
conduct and as a wholesome warning to 
defendant and others not to engage in 
s imilar indiscretions. 
247 P.2d. at 434. 
In Holland vs. Moreton, 10 Utah 2d. 390, 353 P.2d. 989 
(1960), an action was brought alleging fraud in connection with 
the sale of a mining claim. In that case, the court stated: 
Where there is a wrong involving the 
violation of a duty springing from a 
relation of trust or confidence and the 
wrong is of a gross and aggravated nature, 
the malicious conduct necessary to 
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justify punitive damages may be found. 
In submitting the case of punitive 
damages, the court correctly instructed 
the jury that they could award such 
damages only if they found that 
Moreton's conduct was willful and 
malicious. [Emphasis added.] 
353 P.2d. at 995. 
Thus, even where there was a relationship of trust between the 
parties resulting in a higher standard of care, the court still 
required plaintiff to prove a state of mind evidenced by malice 
and willful conduct. 
In Smoot v. Lund, 13 Utah 2d. 168, 369 P.2d. 933 (1962), 
the court affirmed the dismissal of a claim for exemplary damages 
stating that such damages "may be awarded only where a willful 
and malicious injury has been perpetrated.tf Ld« a t Pa8e 936. 
In Powers v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d. 152, 379 P.2d. 380 
(1963), the trial court submitted the issue to the jury as to 
whether the conduct of the defendant was willful and malicious. 
Under the facts of that case, the defendant's horses trespassed 
on plaintiff's property "even after repeated warnings and 
remonstrances . . . with indifference to the consequences and to 
plaintiff's rights." The Supreme Court sustained the awarding of 
punitive damages upon a finding of deliberate and willful con-
duct. 
In Palombi v. D & C Builders, 22 Utah 2d. 297, 452 P.2d. 
325 (1969), the court rejected plaintiff's claim for punitive 
damages stating that it must appear "not only that there was a 
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wrongful invasion of plaintiff's rights, but that it was done 
willfully and maliciously." 452 P.2d. at 328. 
In Prince v. Peterson, 538 P.2d. 1325 (Utah 1975), the 
court allowed but reduced the punitive damages stating that such 
damages may be awarded only if "the jury finds that such injury 
was willful and malicious." 538 P.2d. at 1329. 
In Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d. 354 (Utah 1975), the 
court stated the purpose of punitive damages which are "a punish-
ment of the defendant for a particularly grievous injury caused 
by conduct which is not only wrongful, but which is willful and 
malicious." 542 P.2d. at 539. 
Thus, prior to 1979, it is abundantly clear that the 
award of punitive damages must be founded upon nothing less than 
willful and malicious conduct, or at the very least some inten-
tional act to do harm or injury. 
In Terry v. ZCMI, 605 P.2d. 314 (Utah 1979); modified 
617 P.2d. 700 (Utah 1980), a customer brought a malicious prose-
cution, false arrest and false imprisonment action against a 
merchant. In recognizing the general rule, the court stated: 
Generally in personal injury cases the rule 
is that before the jury can award punitive 
or exemplary damages, the party against whom 
the damages are to be awarded must have acted 
willfully and maliciously. 
605 P.2d. at 327. 
The court then went on to recognize an exception to the rule in 
false imprisonment cases. By its own terms, the exception found 
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in Terry was to apply only to false imprisonment cases. Relying 
on the case of Remmick v. Mills, 165 N.W. 61, 71 (N.D. 1968), the 
court stated: 
It has long been the rule that in false 
imprisonment cases punitive damages may 
be awarded when a wrongful act is done 
recklessly or in open disregard of one's 
civil obligations and the rights of 
others. 
This presumed malice or malice in law does 
not consist of personal hate or ill will of 
one person towards another, but rather refers 
to that state of mind which is reckless of law 
and of the legal rights of the citizen in a 
person's conduct towards that citizen. 
Therefore, in false imprisonment cases, the 
defendent need not act with actual ill will 
or hatred towards the person being confined. 
In such cases malice in law will be implied 
from injustifiable conduct which causes the 
injury complained of or from a wrongful act 
intentionally done without cause or excuse. 
[Emphasis added.] 
605 P.2d. at 327. 
The fact that the Terry case was specifically limited to 
false imprisonment cases was made clear in EIkington v. Foust, 
618 P.2d. 37 (Utah 1980), an action brought by a daughter against 
her stepfather for sexual assault and abuse. In affirming an 
award of punitive damages, the court stated therein: 
Punitive damages may be awarded where the 
nature of the wrong complained of and the 
injury inflicted goes beyond merely 
violating the rights of another in that 
it is found to be willful and malicious. 
They are allowed as a punishment to the 
offender and as a warning to him and 
others not to engage in similar vexatious 
actions. (Emphasis added.) 
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618 P.2d. at 41. 
Further, in First Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. 
Feedyards, 653 P.2d. 591 (Utah 1982) (decided after Terry)f the 
court again affirmed the "willful and malicious" standard in non-
false imprisonment cases. In that case, damages were awarded for 
wrongful attachment by the bank. In discussing the award of 
$100,000.00 punitive damages, the court stated: 
Punitive damages constitute "an extraordinary 
remedy" . . . outside the field of usual 
redress remedies "which should be applied 
with caution lest engendered by passion or 
prejudice because of defendant's wrongdoing, 
the^award becomes unrealistic or unreasonable." 
Such damages may be awarded "where the nature 
of the wrong complained of and the injury 
inflicted goes beyond merely violating the 
rights of another in that it is found to be 
willful and malicious." (Emphasis added.) 
Id. at page 598. 
Consequently in at least two cases following Terry, the court 
affirmed the standard for imposing punitive damages as "willful 
and malicious" standard, and not a "reckless indifference" 
standard. 
Then in Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d. 267 
(1982), the court discussed a broader standard for punitive dama-
ges relying on language in Terry v. ZCMI, (supra.). A property 
owner had sued an adjoining landowner for pollution of the plain-
tiff's culinary water caused by percolation of oil wells on 
defendant's property. Defendant in that case trespassed on 
plaintiff's land, spraying wastewater over it and failed to 
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comply with state law. The Court held that defendent's discharge 
of wastewater into the disposal pit, intending that it seep into 
and percolate through the soil, was willful, intentional and 
carried out in disregard of plaintiff's rights. The conduct was 
sufficient to support a finding of a willful and intentional act 
that could very well have been sufficient under language used 
before Terry v. ZCMI for allowing punitive damages. 
In Behrens v. Raleigh Hills, 675 P.2d. 1179 (Utah 1983), 
plaintiff brought a wrongful death action against Raleigh Hills 
Hospital seeking punitive damages. The evidence established that 
on the third day of the decedent's admission to the hospital, a 
hospital employee had allowed the decedent to use a razor to 
shave. Instead, the decedent used the razor to slash his wrists 
and died four days later. In discussing the standard for the 
imposition of punitive damages, the court stated: 
Our cases have generally held that punitive 
damages may be awarded only on proof of 
"willful and malicious" conduct [cites 
omitted.], or on proof of conduct which 
manifests a knowing and reckless indif-
ference toward, and disregard of the 
rights of others, Branch v. Western 
Petroleum, Inc., supra.; Terry v. Zion1s 
Cooperative Merchantile Institution, supra., 
~ 7*~* '. [Emphasis added.] 
Id. at page 1186. 
It is important to note that the cases relied on for the 
"knowing and reckless indifference toward, and disregard of, the 
rights of others" standard are Terry (strictly limited to false 
imprisonment cases) and Branch (which relied on Terry). It is 
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also important to note that the Supreme Court did not say that 
mere reckless conduct itself would support a claim for punitive 
damages. Only if such reckless conduct evidenced "a knowing and 
reckless indifference toward, and disregard of the rights of 
others, could such damages be awarded." Behrens v. Raleigh 
Hills, 675 P.2d at 1186. 
In 1984, the Utah Supreme Court specifically overturned 
Terry in McFarland v. Skaggs Companies, Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 
1984) stating: 
In light of the apparent weight of authority 
and persuasive scholarly reasoning in support 
of defendant's position, we find that a 
sufficient and sound basis exists for 
departing from the malice in law standard 
followed in Terry. Accordingly, we adopt 
as the appropriate standard for determining 
the availability of a punitive damage award 
in an action for false imprisonment that of 
"malice in fact1' or "actual malice". 
Having expressly overturned Terry, the Court impliedly overturned 
those decisions which rely on the Terry "malice in law" standard. 
Plaintiff argues that the McFarland holding was limited only to 
false imprisonment cases. Even if that be true, the Branch and 
the Behrens cases specifically relied on language from the Terry 
decision, and must be viewed as progeny for the standard used in 
Terry. Once Terry is overturned, it is arguable that the progeny 
fall with it. 
Admittedly, however, several cases since McFarland have 
discussed a "reckless indifference" standard for the imposition 
of punitive damages. The cases do not state whether such a stan-
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dard is the standard in all non-false imprisonment cases or 
whether a "reckless disregard11 standard may be relied on only in 
an appropriate case. These cases clearly suggest, however, that 
the focus must be placed on the defendant's intent regarding his 
conduct. Only if such conduct is supportive of a state of mind 
evidencing a "knowing and reckless indifference" can an award of 
punitive damages stand. 
In Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Company, Ltd., 701 
P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985), for example, the Utah Supreme Court was 
faced with a case involving fraud, misrepresentation, and deceit. 
The allegations of the complaint were not refuted. The Court 
indicated: 
Punitive damages, among other things, punish 
conduct which manifests a knowing or reckless 
indifference toward, and disregard of, the 
rights of others. 
Id. at page 1112. 
Although the court refers to a "knowing or reckless indifference 
toward, and disregard of, the rights of others" standard, it is 
clear that the court was not adopting nor applying such a stan-
dard in that case. The "intentional, willful and malicious" 
allegations of plaintiff's complaint were unrefuted. The fraud, 
misrepresentation and deceit allegations were unchallenged. The 
court's comment indicate that a knowing and reckless indifference 
may support a claim for punitive damages only in those cases 
where the reckless indifference is supportive of a finding of 
malice. 
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In Von Hake v, Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985), an 
action was brought alleging fraud in the acquisition of the 
Von Hake ranch. Awards of $487,200.00 actual damages and 
$500,000.00 punitive damages was affirmed. In that case, the 
jury was instructed that it could award punitive damages only 
upon a finding that defendant's conduct was willful and mali-
cious. The jury apparently so found and the court affirmed the 
finding. However, the Utah Supreme Court, in reviewing the deci-
sion, again referred to the criteria spelled out in Behrens which 
adopted the reasoning of Branch, which adopted the reasoning of 
Terry. Again, the court is recognizing a reckless and indif-
ferent standard only if such conduct is knowing and is supportive 
of malice. 
In Atkin, Wright and Miles v. The Mountain States 
Telephone and Telegraph, 20 Utah Advance Reports 20 (1985), the 
Utah Supreme Court again had occasion to review the award of 
punitive damages. In reversing the trial court*s award of puni-
tive damages, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Before punitive damages may be awarded, 
the plaintiff must prove conduct that is 
willful and malicious, Lehi Furnisture 
and Carpet Company v. Isom, Utah 657 P.2d 
243, 312 (1982); First Security Bank of 
Utah v. T.B.J. Feedyards, Inc., Utah, 653 
P.2d 591, 598 (1982); Elkington v. Foust, 
Utah, 618 P.2d 37, 41 (1980); Kesler v. 
Rogers, Utah, 542 P.2d 354, 359 (1975), 
or that manifests a knowing and reckless 
indifference and disregard towards the 
rights of others. Branch v. Western 
Petroleum, Inc., Utah 657 P.2d 267, 277-
78 (1982); Terry v. Zionfs Cooperative 
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Merchantile Institution, Utah 605 P.2d 
314, 327 (1979). 
It is interesting to note that Terry was cited for support of a 
"reckless indifference" standard, despite the fact that it was 
expressly overturned in McFarland. However, the court does not 
say that punitive damages are allowed for reckless conduct alone. 
Rather, the court states that punitive damages are allowed for 
willful and malicious conduct, or conduct which manifests a 
"knowing and reckless indifference towards the rights of others" 
(i.e., state of mind as evidenced by the conduct). Mere care-
less, negligent, or even reckless conduct, without evil motive or 
design, or intentional or willful conduct as a minimum should not 
support an award for punitive damages. 
If plaintiff1s position were adopted by this court (i.e. 
reckless or wanton activity is sufficient basis for an award of 
punitive damages (Appellant's brief, p. 12), this would allow the 
threat of punitive damages to be used as an in terrorem weapon in 
every negligence case. The distinctions between negligence, 
carelessness, and recklessness are so fine that they are not sub-
ject to precise definition. As defined in Black's Law 
Dictionary, Revised 4th Edition, citations omitted: 
"Negligence" has been defined as: 
The omission to do something which a 
reasonable man, guided by those ordinary 
considerations which ordinarily regulate 
human affairs would do, or the doing of 
something which a reasonable and prudent 
man would do. 
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"Careless" has been defined as: 
Synonymous with "negligent", the latter 
being probably the better word in 
pleadings. Adsence of ordinary or 
proper care. Reckless. [Emphasis added.] 
"Reckless" is defined as: 
Not recking; careless, heedless, inattentive; 
indifferent to consequences. According to 
circumstances, it may mean desperately 
heedless, wanton or willful, or it may 
mean only careless, inattentive, or 
negligent. [Emphasis added.] 
Because the definitions of each of these terms overlap, it is 
difficult to determine under what circumstances "recklessness" 
would be the basis for punitive damages. Plaintiff contends that 
in any negligence case, reckless conduct may form a basis for an 
award of punitive damages. In any case of simple negligence, a 
plaintiff therefore could attempt to obtain an award of punitive 
damages by the semantical interplay of "careless or negligent" 
conduct with "reckless" conduct. The threat of an award of puni-
tive damages in simple negligence cases then becomes an in 
terrorem weapon in every negligence case. For these reasons it 
is respectively submitted that the conduct which manifests "ill 
will, malice, intent or other evil design" only should support a 
claim for punitive damages. Mere reckless conduct, devoid of a 
knowing, malicious, or intentional state of mind, would not form 
the basis for such an award. Applying this standard, the trial 
court correctly granted a partial summary judgment eliminating 
plaintiff's claims for punitive damages. 
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POINT II, 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION CAN BE SUSTAINED 
ON ADDITIONAL GROUNDS, i.e. THERE WAS NO 
RECKLESS CONDUCT. 
The trial court in its memorandum decision, striking 
plaintiff's claim for punitive damages, does not specifically 
address the fact that there was no reckless conduct. Such was 
discussed in the record, however, and does support the trial 
court's judgment. Although appellants may not raise a contention 
for the first time on appeal, the respondent may urge any point 
reflected by the record in support of the trial court's judgment 
during the appellate process. Spencer v. Community Hospital of 
Evanston, 87 II. Appeals 3rd 214, 408 N.E.2d 981, 985 (1980). 
See also Fuller v. Favorite Theater Co., 119 Utah 570, 230 P.2d 
335 (Utah 1951) (Ordinarily respondent may urge any matter 
appearing in record in support of judgment appealed from); Adams 
v. Liedholt, 38 Colo. App. 463, 536 P.2d 15, affirmed 579 P.2d 
618 (1976). 
It is clearly reflected in the record that the plain-
tiff, after completing its extensive discovery, had no evidence 
whatsoever of any reckless conduct on the part of the defendant. 
As stated earlier, plaintiff had no evidence that the defendant 
had run a stop sign. (See Facts Section.) Although the evidence 
produced during discovery and plaintiff's assertions during trial 
are conflicting, plaintiff's own testimony states that she esti-
mated the defendant's speed at the time of accident to be only 30 
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mph. (Partial transcript of trial proceeding, p. 117, lines 
6-19.) 
During a hearing for a motion to reconsider, the 
following was clearly expressed: 
The Court: What kind of evidence do you have 
that intoxication had anything to do with 
this accident? 
Mr. Sullivan: Your Honor, she had just gotten 
out of a wine and cheese party, literally. 
She had just got into her car from a wine 
and cheese party and was pulling out of a 
little hotel place where they were having 
the party when the accident occurred. 
The Court: So what? 
Mr. Sullivan: Her intoxication level was 
.10. She was convicted. We do not have 
evidence as to this yet. There is reason 
to believe she may have other drunk driving 
situations in her past. 
Mr. Williams: I'll object to that. There 
is no evidence of that whatsoever. 
The Court: Whether there is or whether 
there is not, doesn't have anything to do 
with this case. So you're saying she had 
been to a wine and cheese party. She had 
.10, and she got in an accident. 
Mr. Sullivan: That's right. 
The Court: Anything else that indicates 
that her conduct—was she traveling in 
an extraordinary high rate of speed? 
Did she collide with more than one car? 
Was she weaving about the road? Was 
there anything to indicate that she was 
so intoxicated that we ought to be 
offended by her conduct? 
Mr. Sullivan: This intersection is sort 
of a lfTlf intersection. There was no 
reason—that is, she had better sight to 
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her left than to her right. There is 
no reason for her not to see the plaintiff 
in this situation* There is no obstruction. 
The Court: That is just simple negligence. 
It happens all the time when people haven't 
been drinking. That's the danger of this, 
because someone may have had a drink. 
Whether you believe in it or whether you 
don't is not the issue. But the question 
is, I can certainly see occasions where if 
someone is so intoxicated; that assuming 
your evaluation of the law is correct, 
where someone is driving down State Street 
at noon with a .3, and crashing into a 
pedestrian, and traveling at a high rate 
of speed, and weaving about, that's 
something different than someone has 
been to a wine and cheese party, and 
failing to see what a lot of people fail 
to see that haven't had a lot to drink. 
That's the danger. Once you introduce 
the question of the intoxication, you 
open up a Pandora's box to all kinds of 
abuses. [Emphasis added.] 
(Partial transcript, p. 169-171) 
Thus, it is clear that after extensive discovery, the 
facts most favorable to the plaintiff are as follows: (1) there 
was an accident at the T-intersection in question; (2) defendant 
failed to maintain a proper lookout and failed to yield the right 
of way; (3) that at the time of the accident, the defendant had 
just come from a wine and cheese party and had a blood alcohol 
level of .10; and (4) defendant was traveling 30 mph at most. 
There is no evidence that said blood alcohol level in any way 
contributed to the accident. Thus, it is clear that no 
reasonable minds could differ on the issue that there was no 
reckless conduct as a matter of law. Thus, even if this court 
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decides to extend the "reckless disregard" standard as justifying 
punitive damages in all claims except false imprisonment, the 
trial court's striking the punitive damages in this case was 
still correct and should still be affirmed by this court, 
POINT III, 
AN ALLEGATION OF DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED IS 
INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY AN AWARD OF PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has not specifically addressed 
the question of whether driving under the influence of intoxi-
cants is sufficient to allow the jury to consider an award of 
punitive damages. However, a review of the case law, supra,, 
clearly suggests that to allow a jury to consider punitive 
damages on the mere allegation of intoxication would go well 
beyond the parameters established by the court. 
Although some jurisdictions have allowed the jury to 
consider punitive damages for an allegation of driving while 
intoxicated, other courts have refused to go to that extreme and 
have simply noted that the conduct of driving while intoxicated 
does not amount to a malicious or willful act that has tradi-
tionally allowed punitive damages. In Baber v, Dennis, 419 
N.E.2d. 16 (Ohio Appeals 1979), the plaintiff alleged that defen-
dant was under the influence of alcohol and intoxicated and 
crashed her automobile in the rear end of the automobile driven 
by plaintiff, Defendent's intoxication was alleged to amount 
to "willful, wanton, and recklessness conduct11, and plaintiff 
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requested punitive damages. The trial court allowed the issue of 
punitive damages to go to the jury and plaintiff was awarded 
$10,000.00 in punitive damages. The appellate court therein 
reversed the trial court and specifically held that evidence of 
defendant's intoxication was insufficient to permit the issue 
of punitive damages to be submitted to the jury. The court 
stated: 
We conclude that the Supreme Court of Ohio 
has not recognized or created a new 
independent cause for wanton misconduct 
where there has been a single, simple 
violation of the motor vehicle laws and 
that the extension of the right to 
punitive damages in such a case is 
unwarranted at this time regardless of 
the nature of the unintentional legal 
violation. Speed, for example, however 
excessive, does not change the nature of 
the cause of action; and the rule, to 
this date, is the same even though a 
condition of intoxication is present. 
Id. at p. 20. 
Fairly recently the Supreme Court of Ohio adopted this 
same reasoning in the case of Detling v. Chockley, 436 N.E.2d. 
208 (Ohio 1982). In that case, plaintiff was a passenger on a 
motorcycle that was struck by an automobile driven by defendant 
and in plaintiff's complaint, she alleged that defendant, "was 
operating his motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol 
and negligently and carelessly caused this collison." During the 
course of the litigation, plaintiff attempted to amend her corn-
paint and allege punitive damages. The trial court denied the 
motion to amend on the basis that operating a vehicle under the 
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influence of alcohol was not sufficient to permit the jury 
consider punitive damages. The court of appeals affirmed 
judgment of the trial court on the issue of punitive damag 
did the Supreme Court of Ohio* The court stated: 
An act of mere negligence does not, of 
itself, demonstrate the degree of intention 
and deliberation necessary to raise a 
question of punitive damages, [Cites 
omitted.] "Something more than the 
mere commission of a tort is always required 
for punitive damages. There must be 
circumstances of aggravation or outrage, 
such as spite or 'malice,1 or a fraudulent 
or evil motive on the part of the defendant, 
or such a conscious and deliberate disregard 
of the interests of others that his conduct""" 
may be called willful or wanton. Lack of 
this element, there is general agreement 
that mere negligence is not enough, even 
though it is so extreme in degree as to be 
characterized as 'gross1 . . . . 
• • * 
Moreover, appellant's argument that evidence 
of intoxication alone should raise such an 
issue begs the threshhold question of 
causation. Punitive damages may be imposed 
only after establishing the defendant's 
intoxication was the cause of the accident. 
. . . "It would be possible for a drunken 
driver to commit a negligent act in such as 
manner as to not indicate intoxication. 
For example, a drunken driver could be well 
within the speed limit, drive a straight 
line and have a rear-end collision with a 
car stopped at an intersection. Rear-end 
collisions are very common and are mostly 
due to inattention, not intoxication. In 
such an instance, it is extremely unlikely 
one could get punitive damages and it is 
arguable that one should not." [Emphasis 
added.] 
Id. at 211-212. 
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The above holding in Detling v. Chockley, supra., was 
later recognized by the United States Court of Appeals, Sixth 
Circuit in Moran v. Johns Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d. 811 
(6th Cir. 1982), and reaffirmed by the Ohio Supreme Court in 
Locofrance United States Corp. v. Interstate Distribution 
Services, Inc., 451 N.E.2d. 1222 (Ohio 1983). 
In Giddings v. Zellan, 160 F.2d. (D.C. Cir. 1947), an 
action was brought by plaintiff to recover punitive damages from 
the defendant in an auto accident in which the defendant was 
intoxicated. The jury was instructed on punitive damages and a 
verdict was awarded in favor of plaintiff. The circuit court 
reversed and, applying Maryland law, stated: 
That the defendant had proved only 
drunkenness which is neither malice, fraud, 
or evil intent. 
I_d. at 587. 
Further, in Ruther v. Tyra, 247 P.2d 964 (Okla. 1952), 
defendant was awarded punitive damages on his counterclaim 
because of evidence of drinking on the part of plaintiff. The 
Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that it was error to instruct the 
jury on punitive damages because there was no evidence of, 
"oppression, fraud or malice", which by statute in the state of 
Oklahoma justifies punitive damages. The court stated: 
To entitle the plaintiff to recover exemplary 
damages in an action sounding in tort, the 
proof must show some element of fraud, malice 
or oppression. The act which constitutes the 
cause of action must be actuated by, or 
accompanied with, some evil intent, or must 
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be the result of such gross negligence, such 
disregard of another's rights, as is deemed 
equivalent to such intent, 
1^. at 968-969, 
Finally, in Sears Roebuck and Co. v, Jones, 303 S.W.2d, 
432 (Tex, 1957), the Texas court held that an unlawful act is not 
of itself a ground for punitive damages and that an accident 
involving two trucks where defendant was intoxicated did not sup-
port evidence that such driver acted wantonly or maliciously as 
to justify the imposition of punitive damages, 
POINT IV. 
UTAH SOCIAL POLICY DOES NOT MANDATE THE 
IMPOSITION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN THIS CASE. 
Plaintiff asserts that compelling social policy mandates 
support for the use of punitive damages in drunk driving cases 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 8), and that the use of punitive damages 
in such cases is consistent with legislative intent. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 10). In the Appellant's Brief, the plain-
tiff states: 
The Utah Legislature has expressed its strong 
resolve to punish drunk drivers by passing 
one of the strongest and most severe impaired 
driving laws in the country. See §41-6-43, 
et. seq. The new law provides mandatory jail 
sentences for first-time offenders as well as 
the mandatory suspension of a driver's license. 
(Appellant's Brief p. 10) 
In the case of Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc., 
675 P.2d at 1186 (Utah 1983) and in Atkin, Wright, and Miles v. 
The Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company, 20 Utah 
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Advance Reports at 24 (1985), the Utah Supreme Court has clearly 
stated: 
Punitive damages "are not intended as 
additional compensation to a plaintiff 
[and] must, if awarded, serve a societal 
interest of punishing and deterring out-
rageous and malicious conduct which is 
not likely to be deterred by other means." 
Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc., 
Utah 675 P.2d 1179, 1186 (1983). Before 
punitive damages may be awarded, the 
plaintiff must prove conduct that is 
willful and malicious [cites omitted], 
or that manifests a knowing and reckless 
indifference or disregard toward the 
rights of others. [Emphasis added]. 
20 Utah Advance Reports at 24. 
It is clear that Utah law does not provide for punitive 
damages unless there is "outrageous and malicious conduct" which 
is "not likely to be deterred by other means." As pointed out by 
the plaintiff, the Utah legislature has expressed "one of the 
strongest and most severe impaired driving laws in the country." 
Thus, by plaintiff1s own admission, it is clear that the award of 
punitive damages in civil cases involving a defendant who has 
driven under the influence of intoxicants is clearly 
inappropriate since such conduct is "likely to be deterred by 
other means." Certainly the strongest and most severe impaired 
driving law is likely to deter conduct. In this regard, the Utah 
legislature has clearly established where the punishment and 
deterence is to take place and that is in the criminal law and 
not the civil law. 
In the case of Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc., 
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supra., so heavily relied upon by the plaintiff, the court 
clearly stated the purpose of punitive damages: 
Since punitive damages are not intended as 
additional compensation to the plaintiff, 
they must, if awarded, serve a societal 
interest of punishing and deterring out-
rageous and malicious conduct which is not 
likely to be deterred by other means. 
Id. at p. 1186. 
The Utah Supreme Court could not be more clear that 
punitive damages are not intended as compensation to the plain-
tiff but are to serve the interests of society. The plaintiff 
should not be allowed to line her pockets with money taken from 
the defendant in the interest of society, and where such award is 
in addition to the compensatory damages she recovers for the 
violation to her rights protected by the civil law. As stated in 
the Appellant's Brief, the defendant was convicted for driving 
under the influence. (Appellate1s Brief, p. 2). Defendant's 
driver's license was suspended for a year and defendant was 
required to pay a fine. Such suspension and fine was the 
punishment and deterrence judged to be appropriate by the court 
in the criminal trial and also by the state legislature. 
Plaintiff now seeks to appropriate to herself society's due after 
society has already extracted from the defendant what the court 
and legislature has deemed appropriate punishment and deterence. 
Clearly this has never been the intent of Utah law. 
In the case of Glissman v. Rutt, 372 N.E.2d. 188 (Ind. 
App. 1978), an action was brought to recover for injuries 
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sustained in an automobile collision. The trial court rendered 
summary judgment for the defendant on the claim of punitive 
damages and plaintiffs appealed. The court of appeals held 
that where defendant had been convicted and sentenced for the 
offense of reckless driving in connection with the accident, 
plaintiffs were barred from recovering punitive damages. 
It should be noted that under the facts of our present 
case, defendant was not charged nor convicted with reckless 
driving, a specific intent crime. Rather, defendant in our case 
was only charged with the violation of an absolute liability 
crime, namely operating a motor vehicle with an alcohol blood 
level in excess of .08. Such statute, as pointed out by 
plaintiff, is one of the most stringent in the country. Clearly 
the facts presented in the instant case make a stronger argument 
for the denial of punitive damages than the facts in Glissman. 
In Glissman, punitive damages were denied in light of a convic-
tion for a specific intent crime which would be more analogous to 
the civil malice in fact standard. Under the facts of the 
present case, however, defendant was convicted of an absolute 
liability crime which specifically carries a standard of simple 
negligence. (Utah Code Annotated Sec. 41-6-44 (3)(b)). If the 
imposition of punitive damages was prohibited under the facts of 
Glissman, clearly the court under the facts present in the 
instant case should deny punitive damages. 
In Glissman, the court stated: 
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At the outset it must be recalled that a 
civil litigant has no absolute right to 
secure punitive, or exemplary damages, 
[Cites omitted]. They are awarded in 
furtherance of public policy to promote 
the public safety and punish and deter 
certain wrongdoers. [Cites omitted]. 
Considering this basis for punitive damages, 
the court in Taber v. Hutson, (1954), 5 Ind. 
322, 325, reversed an award in a civil action 
for assault and battery, stating: 
Where the defendant is sued for the 
commission of a tort, such as slander, 
an offense not the subject of 
criminal punishment, the rule that 
gives damages fto punish the offender,1 
may, with some degree of propriety, 
be applied, because it is the only 
mode in which, by public example, 
the various rights in community to 
personal security and private property 
can, under the sanction of law, be 
protected from injury and outrage. 
In such a case, there is wisdom in 
permitting a jury to 'blend together 
the interest of society and of the 
aggrieved individual.f 
But there is a class of offenses, 
the commission of which, in addition 
to the civil remedy allowed the 
injured party, subjects the offender 
to a state prosecution. To this 
class, the case under consideration 
belongs; and if the principle of 
the instruction be correct, Taber 
may be twice punished for the same 
assault and battery. This would 
not accord with the spirit of our 
institutions. The Constitution 
declares, that 'no person shall be 
twice put in jeopardy for the same 
offense;1 and though that provision 
may not relate to the remedies 
secured by civil proceedings, still 
it serves to illustrate a fundamental 
principle inculcated by every well-
regulated system of government, viz., 
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that each violation of the law should 
be certainly followed by one appropriate 
punishment and no more. 
The state has undertaken to vindicate 
her own wrongs; and can there be any 
valid reason why such vindication 
should be the result of a suit in 
favor of the private individual? 
It matters little to the offender 
what be the form in which he pays 
the penalty, so that he pays but once; 
but the rules of pleading and evidence 
to not permit a judgment like the 
present to be set up as a bar to a 
state prosecution. Hence, the 
defendant still remains liable to 
be tried and convicted for a public 
offense. Though liable to be 
punished, a civil proceeding may not, 
it is true, be instituted against 
him; but that contingency does not 
affect the principle involved, 
because the penalty which he has 
incurred belongs to the state, and 
her failure to sue for it would 
furnish no reason for its recovery 
in this action. 
Id. at p. 1190. 
POINT V. 
THE IMPOSITION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN A CIVIL 
SUIT WHERE A CRIMINAL PENALTY HAS ALREADY BEEN 
ASSESSED AGAINST THE SAME DEFENDANT FOR THE 
SAME CONDUCT VIOLATES THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Article 1, Section 12, of the Constitution of Utah 
states: " . . . nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy 
for the same offense." [Emphasis added.] The Utah Supreme Court 
has clearly stated that the purpose of punitive damages is to 
punish and deter. Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc., 675 
P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983); Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co., 
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Ltd, , 701 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985); and Atkin, Wright and Miles v. 
The Mountain States and Telegraph Co,, 20 Utah Advance Reports 20 
(1985). As stated earlier, the defendant has already been 
punished for the act of driving under the influence of intoxi-
cants on August 21, 1981, at the intersection of 5065 W. North 
Temple in Salt Lake City, Utah. For this identical conduct, 
plaintiff now seeks to penalize the defendant again by the 
imposition of punitive damages. Thus if plaintiff's argument 
prevails, defendant will be punished twice for the same 
wrong. Although some other jurisdictions allow imposition of 
punitive damages in a civil action even though the same wrongful 
conduct of the defendant may subject him to criminal punishment, 
most of those jurisdictions have either failed to address the 
double jeopardy argument or, if they have done so, have merely 
relied on "the great weight of authority11 to support their 
rulings following other cases. See Bundy v. Maginess, 76 Cal. 
532, 18 P. 668 (1888); Klam v. Koppel, 63 Idaho 171, 118 P.2d 729 
(1941); Rosnak v. Leathers, 277 Ore. 207, 560 P.2d 275 (1977). 
If the imposition of punitive damages, after the imposition of a 
criminal fine and other criminal penalties, does not violate 
double jeopardy, it would be for one of two reasons: (1) that 
double jeopardy is confined to criminal prosecutions, or (2) that 
criminal penalties are for the wrong done to society whereas 
punitive damages are for the wrong done to the individual. 
In regard to this first argument, the Utah Constitution 
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clearly states: 
The accused shall not be compelled to give 
evidence against himself; . . . , nor shall 
any person be twice put in jeopardy for the 
same offense. 
Constitution of Utah, Article 1, Sec. 12. 
It is clear that the Utah Constitution makes no distinction with 
regard to double jeopardy between civil and criminal cases. 
Although the first portion of Sec. 12 of Article 1 deals with 
criminal prosecutions, and indeed the first half of the last sen-
tence of said section starts out "the accused," the last phrase 
clearly extends the prohibition against double jeopardy to "any 
person." 
The second argument against the application of double 
jeopardy protection to cases such as this has already been 
discussed. The Utah Supreme Court has made clear as recently as 
Atkins decided October 22, 1985, that punitive damages are for 
the interest of society to punish and deter. In this regard, 
conpensatory damages are imposed for the wrong done to the 
plaintiff. Punitive damages are not intended as additional 
compensation to the plaintiff. In Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541, 
5 P. 119, 120 (1884), the court stated: 
When the convention framed and when the 
people adopted the constitution, both 
understood the purpose of this clause to 
be the prevention of double prosecutions 
for the same offense. Yet, under the rule 
allowing exemplary damages, not only may 
two prosecutions, but also two punishments 
be had. What difference does it make to 
the accused so far as this question is 
-34-
concerned that one prosecution takes the 
form of a civil action in which he is 
called defendant? He is practically 
harrassed with two prosecutions and 
subjected to two convictions; while no 
hypothesis, however ingenious, can 
cloud in his mind the palpable fact that 
for the same act he suffers two punish-
ments? 
Id. at p. 120. 
Punitive damages being for the purpose of punishment and 
deterence are clearly penal in character. Imposition of punitive 
damages subsequent to the imposition of criminal penalties is 
clearly in violation of the letter and spirit of the Utah 
Constitution. 
POINT VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION REGARDING 
AGGRAVATION OF INJURY WAS CLEARLY CORRECT, 
ADEQUATE AND IN NO WAY PREJUDICIAL. 
Plaintiff was not prevented from having her theory of 
the case presented to the jury. The substance of plaintiff's 
proposed instruction No. 11 and the instruction given by the trial 
court are virtually identical. Plaintiff's proposed instruction 
No. 11 reads: 
Plaintiff, Royce Biswell, may not recover 
damages for any pre-existing condition or 
disability she may have had which did not 
result from any fault of the defendant, but 
that she is entitled to recover damages for 
any injury she suffered, including any 
aggravation or lighting up of such a pre-
existing condition or disability, which 
was proximately caused by the defendant's 
negligence. 
The instruction actually given by the trial court reads: 
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You are instructed that the damages that may 
be assessed in this case should not be 
reduced simply because the plaintiff may 
suffer from a pre-existing or abnormal 
condition. If you find that the plaintiff 
suffers from an abnormal or pre-existing 
condition which has not been proximately 
caused by the accident, even though it may 
invite your sympathy, you may not assess 
any damage against the defendant for that 
condition. However, if the accident has 
been a proximate cause of aggravating such 
pre-existing or abnormal condition, that 
should be considered by you in determining 
general damages. 
The operative language of the two instructions is the 
same. Plaintiff's proposed instruction No. 11 states that the 
plaintiff may not recover for any pre-existing condition or 
disability not the result of defendant's fault but that plaintiff 
may recover for aggravation or lighting up of such a pre-existing 
condition or disability. The instruction actually given by the 
trial court states that the jury may not award plaintiff damages 
for any pre-existing condition not caused by the defendant but 
that plaintiff may recover for any aggravation of such pre-
existing condition caused by the defendant. 
In fact, the instruction actually given is more 
favorable to the plaintiff than the instruction the plaintiff 
requested. Unlike plaintiff's requested instruction, the 
instruction actually given states that plaintiff's damages may 
not be reduced because the plaintiff may suffer from a pre-
existing condition. This is omitted in plaintiff's proposed 
instruction. Furthermore, plaintiff s proposed instruction "did 
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not give the jury the slightest inkling that it could award 
plaintiff damages for her entire disability if it found that the 
accident flit up1 or 'activated1 the pre-existing condition." 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 29). The plaintiff's jury instruction 
simply does not refer in any way to any distinction between 
asymptomatic and symptomatic pre-existing conditions. 
Plaintiff cites Brunson v. Strong, 17 Utah 2d. 364, 412 
P.2d 451 (Utah 1966), as authority that a defendant is liable for 
all suffering in an asymptomatic pre-existing condition rather 
than being liable only for the aggravated pain caused by the 
accident. It should be pointed out, however, that no such 
conclusion of law was made by court in that case. In fact, it 
was plaintiff's counsel and not the court in Brunson that 
inferred an asymptomatic pre-existing condition but even plain-
tiff's counsel in Brunson made no claim that the defendant should 
be liable for all pain and suffering undimished by the additional 
cause of the pre-existing arthritis. 
In rejecting plaintiff's appeal and affirming the trial 
court's instructions, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
The instructions should be read in their 
entire context and given meaning in 
accordance with the ordinary and usual 
import of the language as it would be 
understood by lay jurors, rather than by 
resorting to undue niceties of meaning 
or technical distinctions in terms. More 
important than that, they should be looked 
at from the viewpoint of the jury in 
application to the facts as shown by the 
evidence. 
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Brunson v. Strong, 412 P.2d at 452-453. That plaintiff's pro-
posed instruction No. 11 adds nothing to the court's instruction 
No. 17 is so clear that reasonable minds could not reach any 
other result. 
Plaintiff's basic reasoning misses the entire point 
which he is trying to make: If a plaintiff suffers no pain 
before an accident, then the pain experienced after the accident 
which is a result of defendant's conduct is recoverable. If, 
however, a plaintiff experienced pain before an accident, then 
only the additional pain caused by the actions of the defendant 
are recoverable. In either case, defendant is only liable for 
the amount of pain caused by her actions, thus it is completely 
irrelevant whether or not there was pain before the accident. 
It is clear from Utah case law that the trial court's 
instruction regarding aggravation was a correct statement of Utah 
law. If it was different in any way from the instruction 
requested by the plaintiff, it was more favorable than that 
requested by the plaintiff and therefore in no way prejudicial. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The imposition of punitive damages in this case should 
not be allowed without evidence of actual malice, ill will or 
evil motive. For this reason, the trial court properly struck 
plaintiff's claim for punitive damages. 
Even if the court decides a "reckless indifference" 
standard is applicable to this case, the facts of this case 
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clearly indicate that there was no reckless conduct. Therefore, 
the claim for punitive damages were properly struck. 
Driving while intoxicated, in and of itself, is clearly 
insufficient to justify an award of punitive damages. Even if 
the court decides that a "reckless indifference11 standard should 
be applied, there is absolutely nothing in the record to indicate 
intoxication contributed to the cause of this accident. This is 
a case of simple negligence and as such punitive damages are 
inapplicable even if the defendant was driving while intoxicated. 
Under the rule clearly stated in Behrens, that punitive 
damages should not be awarded unless conduct is not likely to be 
deterred by other means, an award of punitive damages in this 
case would clearly be inappropriate in light of the severe 
impaired driving laws in the State of Utah. 
The purpose of criminal penalties in regard to drunk 
driving are to deter and to punish. These are the same purposes 
of punitive damages. Since the defendant was already subject to 
criminal penalties, she should not be twice put in jeopardy 
for the same offense since such would be a violation of Article 
1, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah. 
Finally, the trial court's jury instruction regarding 
aggravation of plaintiff1s injuries was clearly a correct state-
ment of Utah law and in no way prejudicial to the defendant. 
-39-
For the above stated reasons, it is clear that the trial 
court's judgments in this case should be affirmed in every 
respect. 
Dated this (i ~ day of December, 1985. 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
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